Since the mid-1990s, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been an important factor in, and exerts significant influence on both Kazakhstan's international situation and geopolitical processes in Central Asia. Various aspects of Kazakhstan's interests are included in the SCO, among them geopolitics, security, the economy and regional politics. The topics addressed by the SCO can be divided into wide-ranging and often unconnected problems, which are more often than not solved outside the framework of the SCO. In the end, the SCO is only a great 'geopolitical bluff.' And while the USA seems to be almost an 'unofficial partner' because it so influences Central Asia as a whole, the European Union has almost entirely withdrawn from that geopolitical scene. As yet, the SCO poses more challenges and risks for Kazakhstan than it offers advantages.

This article focuses on the deterioration of relations between Georgia and Russia over the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia's separatist conflicts are far more than domestic territorial disputes: they have both regional and international implications, and represent one of the principal obstacles to the development of Georgian-Russian relations. As military skirmishes have threatened to escalate, jeopardizing stability in the volatile Caucasus region, President Mikheil Saakashvili's desire to resolve these protracted conflicts has become symbolic of his vigorous approach to tackling Georgia's more intractable problems.

Dr. Tracey German is a Lecturer in Defense Studies at the Joint Services Command and Staff Colege, King's College, London. Her research focuses on security in the Caucasus region, particulary the Chechen conflict and Georgian-Russian relations, as well as energy issues in former Soviet states.

Russie.Nei.Visions is an electronic collection of policy papers published in French, English and Russian by the Russia/NIS Center, Ifri.

While the EU conceives its neighborhood via regional policies, Russia sees it in terms of geopolitics. A large part of the misunderstanding which prevails on both sides concerning the 'Common Space for External Security' stems from the clash between these different mental maps. By examining the respective and reciprocal implications of these approaches, this paper underlines the need for both parties to become conscious of the conceptual gap between their viewpoints, and to try ultimately reducing it.

Increasing the number of actors participating in the daily dialogue between Russia and the EU can not only contribute to solving important issues surrounding these bilateral relations but also, more broadly speaking, to those surrounding the integration process within Europe itself. The inclusion of business representatives and non-profit organizations in this process would make it easier to gage the different social, economic, and political behaviors within 'Old Europe' and overcome the 'democratic deficit' resulting from the absence of citizen participation in the management of Russia-EU relations, and its monopolization by state bureaucracies.

Barely one year after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine finds itself in the midst of fresh internal and external dislocations. In one respect, the revolution promises to be enduring. Ukraine is a democratic country with a vigorous political life, and a return to state intimidation and political stagnation is no longer feasible. But the revolution has not fulfilled its central promise: the emergence of authorities who, finally, would govern in the interests of the country rather than themselves. With few exceptions, there has been no attempt to challenge the country's dysfunctional institutional inheritance or replace the culture of patronage with meritocracy. This failing has not only created new internal cleavages, but reopened old international vulnerabilities. The Russian Federation has recovered from its post-orange disorientation and is governed by an elite confident that the country's wealth and energy resources can be used to create a 'sphere of predominance' on the doorstep of the EU. Russia's gas diplomacy in Ukraine, a key corridor to European consumers, reinforces the EU's broader stakes in Ukraine's capacity and trajectory. Without indulging Ukraine's illusions about EU membership, the EU needs to develop channels of integration that are both realistic and mutually beneficial.

Since 2003 and after centuries of geopolitical competition, Russia and Turkey have drawn together in a new bilateral relationship. Expanding trade has been a major driving force behind this, but shared disillusionment with United States and European policies and attitudes, as well as increasing common ground on issues in the broader Black Sea region and further afield in the Middle East, have all played a role. At this juncture, the main impact of this new relationship is in Russia and Turkey's joint border area of the South Caucasus - with potentially negative implications for the fragile state of Georgia and for the European Union's new 'Neighborhood Policy' in the region.

Despite the lack of any clear signs of proper 'Europeanization' or any desir to formally joint the European integration process (to became a full member of the European Union - EU), Russia has already become an insider in European political and economic life. Her interaction with the EU, both on a global level and in the sphere of private interests, depends on and is influenced by events within th EU. In this context, Russia can and must also fully consider tactical changes occurring withing decision-making mechanims, and the balance of power within the EU.

Original title in German: 'Deutsche Russlandpolitik: Ende des 'Schmusekurses'?'

The developments in Putin's Russia away from democracy and the constitutional state have also placed Germany's policy on Russia under scrutiny. In the run-up to the election to the Bundestag on September 18th, representatives of the opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP have thus made it clear that they no longer approve of the policy Chancellor Schröder has adopted with regard to Russia. The new EU member states in Eastern and Central Europe are accusing Germany of pursuing a Sonderweg compared with the rest of the EU and attempting to build a special relationship with Russia. This article addresses the question of whether this criticism is justified, and what is behind the 'strategic partnership' that Chancellor Schröder and President Putin have attested to time and again.

Double issue in partnership with the CERFA

Andrei Zagorski, 'Russia and Germany: Continuity and Changes', Russie.Nei.Visions, n.6(a), September 2005

Issue available in French, Russian and German.