Amid rising trade tensions between Europe and China and broader uncertainty in the international rules-based trade regime, Beijing has worked to preserve and bolster the multilateral trading system while at the same time failing to reform the domestic policies that have served to undermine that same system.    

The 2026 Munich Security Conference report observes that “the world has entered a period of wrecking-ball politics.” Indeed, the era of Western predominance, dependable alliances and capable multilateral institutions has given way to shifting balances of power and deepening uncertainty.

With the aim of structurally reducing the European economy’s dependence on fossil fuel imports and accelerating the energy transition, the European Commission has opted for electrification.

This paper examines the two-way relationship between France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and developments in Oceania. Oceania was not a priority in the initial years of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the region was largely treated as secondary to major strategic hotspots and key partnerships, while overseas territories were primarily handled as domestic issues and recipients of a top-down strategy. 

Are Germany’s economic, industrial, and political struggles becoming a liability for the EU’s ability to rise to the geopolitical moment?

Critical raw materials (CRMs) have become central features of a new dynamic in global power politics, with China now wielding considerable leverage. Amid rising regional and global uncertainty, resource security is back in the spotlight as a key determinant of sovereignty and national security for Europe, its allies and its partners. The very survival of key, even vital industries, from automotive to aerospace to health to energy to defense, is at stake.

Since February 2022, Russian missile and long-range drone strikes against Ukraine have served as near-daily reminders of what European states could face in a war with Russia. The same weapon systems battering Ukrainian infrastructure and population centers would be directed against European military and civilian targets in any confrontation between Russia and NATO. As Russian missile production expands and its arsenal diversifies, Europe must confront an uncomfortable question: how to deter, and if push comes to shove, fight Russia's long-range strike arsenal?

This article examines the implications of Trump II for Europe’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The piece contends that Trump II is accelerating the erosion of the rules-based order and undermining the relevance of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept, while forcing Europe to refocus on its own continental security amid US retrenchment. Paradoxically, these very constraints create conditions for a more autonomous, pragmatic, and explicitly interest-driven European engagement in the Indo-Pacific, rather than outright withdrawal.