Japan: The Reluctant Cyberpower

Japan’s cyberdefenses remain underdeveloped compared to the country’s great reliance on information and communications technology. Despite Japan’s initial slow response to the security challenges emerging from cyberspace, this paper posits that cybersecurity under the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has moved to the core of the country’s national security policy. The 2020 Olympics Games are a major catalyst for this.

Over the last two years the Japanese government has indeed laid the structural and legal foundations for becoming a serious player in cyberspace. That effort, however, remains underfunded and is slowed by overly complicated intergovernmental coordination processes and stovepiping within the government.
While Japan remains a reluctant cyberpower with a decidedly defensive outlook and a particularly change-resistant bureaucracy, plagued by vertical compartmentalization, recent initiatives and policies have made it clear that the country is moving in the direction of potentially becoming one of Asia’s more advanced cyberpowers in the not-too-distant future.
This paper first outlines an analytical framework used to evaluate Japan’s current standing and progress as a cyberpower: from whole of government (WoG) to whole of nation (WoN) and whole of system (WoS). The following three sections discuss in detail the evolutionary stages in the development of Japan’s national cybersecurity strategy. The last section deals with the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ changing role in cyberspace and how it is slowly embracing a more militarized response to state-sponsored cyberthreats.
The administration of Prime Minister Abe has been careful not to abandon the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ defensive posture in cyberspace and has not indicated that it will develop offensive cyberwar capabilities. This, however, may change should the new US administration abandon the United States’ historic solid defense commitment to Japan. In that respect, Japan’s deepening of engagement with like-minded countries will assume even greater importance over the next four years.
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Japan: The Reluctant Cyberpower
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analysesUnlocking India’s Energy Transition: Addressing Grid Flexibility Challenges and Solutions
India is rapidly scaling up its renewable energy (RE) capacity, adding 15–20 GW annually, but the ambitious goal of 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 is at risk unless the pace accelerates.
The China-Russia Partnership and the Ukraine War: Aligned but not allied
China and Russia maintain a strategic partnership rooted in shared opposition to the U.S. and liberal democracies, but their relationship is shaped more by pragmatism than trust.
Technical Standards, Soft Connectivity and China’s Belt and Road: Towards greater convergence or fragmentation?
As the intensification of geopolitical competition points toward increased global fragmentation, the definition of technical standards for future markets and industries will play an important role in determining just how deep the fissures will run.
India’s Quest for Economic Emancipation from China
In October 2024, the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi initiated a thaw in relations between the two Asian powers. Has India's high level of economic dependence on China played an important role in bringing about this diplomatic shift?