Rosoboronexport, a federal state unitary enterprise, is at the heart of Russian political power: it is the key pivot of the arms exports policy and of the ongoing consolidations of the Russian military-industrial complex (MIC). On behalf of its Director Sergey Chemezov, a close relation of President Vladimir Putin, Rosoboronexport has become the driving force for the renewal of Russia's military-technical policy, as it benefits from a quasi monopoly on arms exports. Through Rosoboronexport, the Russian state is seeking to modernize the Russian MIC - token of the country's power and influence on the international scene. In order to ensure the long-term success of its takeover operations of Russian industrial companies, Rosoboronoexport now needs to complete its transformation into an industrial holding company and strengthen its privileged position beyond the next Russian presidential elections to be held in 2008.

Energy issues lie at the heart of Ukraine's economic, political and strategic challenges. A year after the 'orange revolution', the 'gas war' served to highlight the country's vulnerable position, being 80% dependent on imports of gas and having the world's most energy-hungry economy. The 2005 crisis also highlighted the extreme opacity of the country's bilateral relations with Russia, which are governed as much by the interests surrounding Gazprom's relations as by those of the state. Yanukovich's return to power in the summer of 2006 coincided with a relative appeasement of relations with Moscow and a new division of spheres of influence in the Ukrainian energy sector.

The recent crises over oil & gas deliveries from Russia to Ukraine and Belarus have triggered alarm and virulent criticism in the West. 

Russia is an unavoidable actor in world energy geopolitics. It is also the biggest energy partner of a European Union (EU) that is becoming ever more dependent on outside sources for its energy needs. However, the future of Russia's largest company-Gazprom-and the development of its future production capacities are at the center of a complex financial and political game dominated by numerous uncertainties, including Gazprom's actual reserves, its ability to invest in exploration and production, and its very capacity to develop production. Indeed, back in state hands, Russian gas and oil companies-Gazprom included-do not appear to be in a position to meet their future production commitments. Gazprom's ability to honor its contracts with gas companies in the EU is in fact already the subject of numerous interrogations.

Russia and the European Union have clearly entered a new stage in their energy relations, defined by a growing asymmetry between a strengthened national monopoly on the supply side and a gradual opening of markets in Europe. In this context, a multitude of new approaches to EU-Russia relations have been voiced recently by a wide variety of experts. Unfortunately, many of them involve 'defensive' solutions, driven by lack of mutual trust on both sides. Is a positive approach nevertheless still possible? The paper argues that competition is a key universal value in the development of a new and sustainable energy relationship between Russia and Europe. It is clear that EU competition regulators should take the lead in setting up a new framework for EU-Russia energy relations in the future. The success of their endeavors will not only determine the security of energy supply for European consumers, but also that of the Russian and Eurasian energy markets.

Russia's relationship with China is complex and contradictory. Bilateral ties are more substantive and multifaceted than ever before, the two countries agree on most regional and international questions, and China is a major customer of Russian arms and energy. However, Moscow is increasingly uneasy about China's transformation as the next global power and the implications of this for Russia's security and place in the world. Balancing delicately between strategic convergence and suspicion, Sino-Russian partnership faces an uncertain future.