While the Pakistani state is on the decline, the militarization of the society increases. By arming the Pashtun tribes so that they stand up to the local Taliban, the Pakistani state fully contributes to its own process of marginalization. That strategy could easily lead to an escalation of the civil war which already rages in the Pashtun belt. Yet, the Taliban challenge only represents one of the threats hanging over Pakistan's future. The decline of the state can be witnessed everywhere.

This content is published in French - Pakistan : du désordre à la guerre civile ?

The term "transformation" is often heard in Western - especially U.S. - military circles. "Transformation" is generally intended to convey the notion of major, productive change for the future that will result in improved military capabilities. A major issue that faces the militaries of most democratic nations is, however, what missions are they transforming for? This article examines that important question, with a particular focus on the types of operations that are likely to predominate in the coming years, and the implications that they will have for the armed forces of the Western nations as they plan for the future.

The concept of strategic surprise has rarely been defined precisely and generally conveys the idea of a badly or non-anticipated threat which unexpectedly hits a state, shaking its conceptions and its position towards security. Until the 1980s strategic surprise would take the form of a nuclear surprise attack. In the 1990s, the idea of a so-called "computer Pearl Harbor" was put forward, which would neutralize the complex systems supporting western societies. With the 9/11 attacks, the threat of a strategic surprise suddenly materialized. After delineating the legitimate scope of the notion of "strategic surprise", highlighting the variability of its effects and underlining the importance of the "target" and of its vulnerability, this paper aims exploring some possible trails and answers, which would attempt to reduce not only the probability of an attack but also its impact.

From Afghanistan to the Central African Republic, through Haiti and Guinea Bissau, 'failed' or fragile states have finally turned out to be much more resilient than planned to the Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and other imported reforms of governance. Their ability to let any reform coming from abroad sink, to block or twist such initiatives strongly contrasts with the weakness of their human and financial resources. The example of the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates the difficulties which are inherent to the concept of SSR.