In Europe, with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine showing little sign of abating, a persistent gap remains between security needs and defense spending. According to a 2006 commitment enshrined at the 2014 Wales NATO summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members should disburse no less than 2% of their national gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, out of which 20% is to be spent on equipment and research and development. In 2024, only 23 Allies out of 32 are expected to meet or exceed this target, though a significant improvement from only three in 2014. This total includes the United States (US) devoting 3.38% of its GDP to defense, constituting almost 70% of all NATO member defense spending combined. 

Outer space, particularly in the telecommunication sector, is benefiting and becoming accessible to more and more actors. But with this trend comes also a reality that is every day more compelling: no meaningful development can be achieved without a clear, stable and predictable interference-free environment for the use and control of all satellites that depend upon ready access to radio frequencies and appropriate geostationary orbital slots to function properly.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the threat of cruise missile proliferation is as equally challenging to NATO as the threat of ballistic missiles. Over the last two decades, the emergence of cruise missiles and UAVs as a threat has been slow, and governments, particularly the United States, have invested much less in cruise missile defenses than in ballistic missile defenses.

Military helicopters have evolved into technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Originally designed to counter Soviet armor, attack helicopters now have to cope with a wide spectrum of threats, some of them bringing them back to their counterinsurgency roots.