Russia's Greater Middle East Policy: Securing Economic Interests, Courting Islam

Russia's foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East is not an aggressive, anti-Western one, but a defensive policy aimed more at protecting Russian economic interests, working with virtually any government that opposes Sunni radicalism, and preventing Moscow from becoming a target of Muslim anger as occurred during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and Chechnya (since 1994).
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, Fairfax, US. He writes on Russian foreign policy, the International Relations of the Middle East, and transnational revolutionary movements.
Russie.Nei.Visions is an electronic collection of policy papers published in French, English and Russian by the Russia/NIS Center, Ifri.
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Russia's Greater Middle East Policy: Securing Economic Interests, Courting Islam
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