Ampo at 50: The Faltering US-Japan Relationship
For the last 50 years the governance of the US-Japan alliance has often been characterized by secret diplomacy and discretionary choices. In the post-war period Japan's strategic choices have given overall priority to sustaining a strong security alliance with the United States.
The small archipelago of Okinawa, which is supporting the bulk of the US military bases in Japan, has particularly suffered from this twisted governance. The difficult transfer of the dangerous Futenma air base in Okinawa, negotiated since 1996, has become the symbol of the complex issues surrounding the US military presence in Japan.
In September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan took office with the intention of revising the alliance in order to build "a more equal relationship with Washington", provoking the ire of the US government. But Tokyo's tergiversations and the failure of Prime Minister Hatoyama to make a viable proposal to relocate the Futenma base outside of Okinawa turned the Japanese people against its government. As a result, the Prime Minister stepped down in early June.
For the alliance to continue and strengthen through the next fifty years, both sides will have to face up to the past and reflect on the relevance of the security treaty and the governance of their relationship.
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Ampo at 50: The Faltering US-Japan Relationship
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