Search on Ifri.org

See the 0 results

About Ifri

Frequent searches

Suggestions

See all our analyses

The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Studies
|
|
Proliferation Papers
Prolif Paper No.65 Cover
Download .pdf (952.06 KB)
Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, and even before February 2022, the Russian government has conducted intense nuclear rhetoric and actions.
Russian Strategic Forces Exercise "Grom-2022'
Russian Strategic Forces Exercise "Grom-2022'
Russian MoD
This behavior is a specific approach to strategic deterrence that seeks to incorporate nonmilitary and military (nuclear and nonnuclear) means into a continuous spectrum of actions for deterrence, escalation management, and warfighting. Nuclear weapons are the foundation of credible strategic deterrence and signaling with these and other strategic capabilities could in theory be instrumental for deterring the escalation of a local conflict to a regional war.
 
Russian signaling varies from aggressive declarations from Putin himself but also Russian officials such as Medvedev or journalistic cronies, to medium to large scale strategic exercises like the infamous Grom. Likewise, on the international stage, Russia has shown restraint by reimplementing the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration, but also deliberate disrespect of arms control agreements, notably by suspending its participation to the New START treaty.
 
In practice, however, Russia’s use of strategic deterrence signaling in this conflict has been met with mixed results insofar as it has not compelled the cessation of or constraints on Western lethal aid to Ukraine, even though it may have, at least in the eyes of Russian officials, deterred direct Western intervention.
 
Consequently, there might be more to expect from Russia, depending on the evolution of the daily battlefield in Ukraine. If the use of a nuclear weapon is still very unlikely, some other strategic moves in the hybrid domain (cyberattacks, attacks on undersea cables, information manipulation) could also serve as signaling.
 
Decoration

Also available in:

Regions and themes

ISBN / ISSN

979-10-373-0744-6

Usage

How can this study be cited ?

Share

Download the full analysis

This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.

The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Download .pdf (952.06 KB)
PDF icon
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programs
A soldier watching a sunset on an armored infantry fighting vehicle
Security Studies Center

Heir to a tradition dating back to the founding of Ifri, the Security Studies Center provides public and private decision-makers as well as the general public with the keys to understanding power relations and contemporary modes of conflict as well as those to come. Through its positioning at the juncture of politics and operations, the credibility of its civil-military team and the wide distribution of its publications in French and English, the Center for Security Studies constitutes in the French landscape of think tanks a unique center of research and influence on the national and international defense debate.

Nuclear ballistic missile submarine, in transit on the surface
Deterrence and Proliferation

The conflicts in Europe, Asia and the Middle East demonstrate a return of nuclear power to the balance of power. Arsenals are being modernized and expanded, while arms control is collapsing. This research program aims to analyze these phenomena.

Find out more
Discover all our analyses
Memos

EUDIS, HEDI, DIANA: What's behind Three Defense Innovation Acronyms?

25 September 2024

In Europe, with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine showing little sign of abating, a persistent gap remains between security needs and defense spending. According to a 2006 commitment enshrined at the 2014 Wales NATO summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members should disburse no less than 2% of their national gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, out of which 20% is to be spent on equipment and research and development. In 2024, only 23 Allies out of 32 are expected to meet or exceed this target, though a significant improvement from only three in 2014. This total includes the United States (US) devoting 3.38% of its GDP to defense, constituting almost 70% of all NATO member defense spending combined. 

Johanna MÖHRING

From Ukraine to Gaza: Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence

10 September 2024

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza show us the extent to which artificial intelligence (AI) has become integral to battlefield operations. 

Amélie FÉREY Laure de ROUCY-ROCHEGONDE

French thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making

13 November 2023

This paper analyses the French literature on France’s perception of military AI, especially its consequences on strategic systems and competition, and nuclear deterrence.

Héloïse FAYET

The Future of Europe’s Strategic Deterrence is (also) at Sea

11 June 2024

A cursory look at both France and the UK suggests that the future of European nuclear deterrence is at sea.

Héloïse FAYET
Page image credits
Russian Strategic Forces Exercise "Grom-2022'
Russian MoD
Related Subjects
Russian Defense , War in Ukraine , Security - Defense , Ukrainian War , Nuclear weapons , Nuclear deterrence , Russia , Ukraine

How can this study be cited?

Prolif Paper No.65 Cover
The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine, from Ifri by
Copy
Prolif Paper No.65 Cover

The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine

Download .pdf (952.06 KB)