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The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

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Proliferation Papers
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Accroche

In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia.

 
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© Gideon Ikigai / Shutterstock
© Gideon Ikigai / Shutterstock
Corps analyses

Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security.

While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain.

The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.

 

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979-10-373-0855-9

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The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Decoration
Author(s)
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Security Studies Center
Accroche centre

Heir to a tradition dating back to the founding of Ifri, the Security Studies Center provides public and private decision-makers as well as the general public with the keys to understanding power relations and contemporary modes of conflict as well as those to come. Through its positioning at the juncture of politics and operations, the credibility of its civil-military team and the wide distribution of its publications in French and English, the Center for Security Studies constitutes in the French landscape of think tanks a unique center of research and influence on the national and international defense debate.

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Nuclear ballistic missile submarine, in transit on the surface
Deterrence and Proliferation
Accroche centre

The conflicts in Europe, Asia and the Middle East demonstrate a return of nuclear power to the balance of power. Arsenals are being modernized and expanded, while arms control is collapsing. This research program aims to analyze these phenomena.

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EUDIS, HEDI, DIANA: What's behind Three Defense Innovation Acronyms?

Date de publication
25 September 2024
Accroche

In Europe, with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine showing little sign of abating, a persistent gap remains between security needs and defense spending. According to a 2006 commitment enshrined at the 2014 Wales NATO summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members should disburse no less than 2% of their national gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, out of which 20% is to be spent on equipment and research and development. In 2024, only 23 Allies out of 32 are expected to meet or exceed this target, though a significant improvement from only three in 2014. This total includes the United States (US) devoting 3.38% of its GDP to defense, constituting almost 70% of all NATO member defense spending combined. 

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From Ukraine to Gaza: Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence

Date de publication
10 September 2024
Accroche

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza show us the extent to which artificial intelligence (AI) has become integral to battlefield operations. 

French thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making

Date de publication
13 November 2023
Accroche

This paper analyses the French literature on France’s perception of military AI, especially its consequences on strategic systems and competition, and nuclear deterrence.

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The Future of Europe’s Strategic Deterrence is (also) at Sea

Date de publication
11 June 2024
Accroche

A cursory look at both France and the UK suggests that the future of European nuclear deterrence is at sea.

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© Gideon Ikigai / Shutterstock

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The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine