Based on the provided excerpts from the interview with the Director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Nils-Andreas Stensønes, several key insights emerge regarding Russia's intentions, the European response, and geopolitical realities in Europe and the Arctic.

Regarding *Russia's intent in Ukraine, Mr. Stensønes states that their goal since the beginning of 2022 remains full control of Ukraine, including demilitarization and what they term "denazification," which he understands as the removal of anyone objecting to the Russian agenda. He believes this goal still stands, even if it takes Russia longer than initially anticipated. More broadly in Europe, listening to President Putin's speeches reveals a desire to redefine the European security architecture to Russia's advantage, based on historical narratives and perceived threats from the West, leading to a belief in Russia's right to control its near abroad.

When it comes to the European response, Mr. Stensønes emphasizes that this is primarily a European problem, although US support is crucial, especially in the short term. Drawing on Kissinger's perspective, he suggests that the conflict in Ukraine **cannot be resolved but must be managed. This requires Europe to be firm and strong enough to deter Russia from future similar actions.

The interview also sheds light on the significance of Russia's shadow fleet. Mr. Stensønes explains that the Russian economy is heavily reliant on hydrocarbon exports, accounting for over one-third of their export income. Currently, 84% of oil exports are transported on ships connected to the shadow fleet, which are typically old, poorly maintained, have unclear ownership, and often do not adhere to international standards. This substandard fleet is crucial for the Russian economy as a means of evading sanctions, allowing them to offload oil to other ships and refineries to disguise its origin and sell at market prices. This also presents a security challenge due to the age and maintenance issues of the vessels and creates unfair competition for respectable ship owners.

Concerning the Arctic region, Mr. Stensønes notes that geopolitical realities began to change in 2014 with the invasion of Crimea and Donbas, leading to a freezing of relationships, particularly in military cooperation. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, almost all cooperation ceased, and Russia was expelled from most cooperative arenas. Currently, limited cooperation remains only on protecting fish stocks, border issues, and search and rescue. Furthermore, Russian ships are largely excluded from Norwegian harbors. The conflict in Ukraine and the broader tension between Russia and the West have created increased uncertainty in the Arctic, raising concerns about small incidents escalating rapidly.

Finally, regarding the Northern Sea Route, Mr. Stensønes points out that while it offers a shorter route between Asia and Europe, it is currently hampered by ice. However, with receding ice, it is projected to be ice-free in the summer within two decades and potentially year-round in a few more, making it a convenient and cheap transportation route with significant business opportunities and risks. He also highlights Russia's efforts to establish firm control over this area based on their interpretation of UNCLOS, even though it should arguably be considered international straits allowing for free trade.