Regards croisés sur la guerre électronique
Information dominance through the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum has become a cornerstone of military superiority. However, it is now threatened by increasingly advanced electronic warfare capabilities.
Although somewhat neglected since the end of the Cold War, electronic warfare has become a crucial aspect of contemporary conflicts again. But as modern battlefield is now undergoing widespread digitization, so is the electromagnetic spectrum which has been deeply transformed through the information technology revolution, thus showing an even greater military potential. However, these unprecedented opportunities come along with new threats and challenge, which only to be met by intensive capability and operational developments. Faced with increasingly tough opponents, Western approach to electronic warfare must be reinvented. In particular, the growing proximity between telecommunications and the digital realm has brought about a cyber-electronic continuum, whose operational convergence could be better used. To preserve their information dominance, Western militaries must equip themselves with the means of developing ever more innovative electronic warfare systems.
This content is only available in French: Regards croisés sur la guerre électronique
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