L'avenir de la surprise tactique à l'heure de la numérisation
Surprise is a crucial dimension of military tactics, which stems from incertitude inherent to war.
Over the last decades, the continuous progress of information technologies has promoted the idea of a “transparent battlefield”. This may lead to question the relevance of the concept of tactical surprise in the digital era. As a matter of fact, far from putting an end to surprise, technological breakthroughs offer new opportunities to create surprise as well as new risks of being surprised. In this renewed tactical context, the French Army will inaugurate in 2018 a comprehensive modernization program named Scorpion, which calls for a reshaping of the command and control structure in order to put surprise at the core of the modes of action, so as to make the most of the technological potential while staying away from overreliance.
This content is available in French: L'avenir de la surprise tactique à l'heure de la numérisation
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