La sécurité énergétique des armées françaises. Le soutien pétrolier à l’heure de la transition
Ever since its inception on the eve of World War One, the concept of securing fuel supply has consistently proven its vitality to military operations.
In France, this mission is handled by the Service des Essences des Armées (SEA) since 1945. By controlling the chain of fuel supply, the SEA has been able to serve as a key organization in supporting French armed forces integration within NATO as well as their operations overseas. However, the SEA is now facing new challenges due to both external hazards (both structural and contextual) and internal vulnerabilities which combine into a systemic “energy risk” that needs to be addressed. In order to do so in the near future, French armed forces will have to fully embrace the challenges of energy transition, so as to turn internationally recognized concepts such as “Green Defense” into operational reality.
This content is available in French: La sécurité énergétique des armées françaises. Le soutien pétrolier à l’heure de la transition.
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analysesFury from the Skies. A Strategic Analysis of Air Campaign against Iran
What is the outcome of Operations Roaring Lion (RL) and Epic Fury (EF), launched by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 28, 2026?
Finland: The Ally Who Came in from the Cold
Among all European countries, Finland is perhaps the one whose strategic culture and military model have changed the least since the end of the Cold War. Built after the end of the Second World War to deter a potential new Soviet invasion, this model enabled Finland to serve as an example of European rearmament.
Stability under Pressure. A Pakistani View on Nuclear Deterrence after Pahalgam
The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis after the Pahalgam attack has generated a familiar but incomplete debate: did nuclear deterrence work, or did it merely allow both sides to fight a limited war under the nuclear shadow? The better answer is that deterrence worked at the level at which it was designed to work. It prevented a general war and an uncontrolled vertical escalation, and kept nuclear weapons in the background. But it did not prevent India from attempting to carve out space for conventional action, nor did it prevent Pakistan from responding conventionally to restore deterrence credibility.