Syria: Russia's Best Asset in the Middle East
Russia's foreign policy towards Syria and the Greater Middle East is generally not aggressive. It is a defensive policy aimed mainly at developing its traditional political and economic interests in the region and protecting its Southern borders.
It is possible that Syria's pivotal role for the Kremlin might be diminished by Russia's growing political and economic involvement with almost all states of that region and its greater stress on profitable economic relations. However, Syria will remain Moscow's most important partner in the Arab East, because of: its relative independence from the West, its secular government, a well-established tradition of bilateral cooperation and the fact that it provides access to the Mediterranean. Russian-Syrian relations have always been more political and strategic than economic in nature. This differentiates them from the relations Russia has with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries of the region.
Until 2010, Andrej Kreutz taught Political Science and History at the University of Calgary and Mount Royal College in Calgary.
Russie.Nei.Visions is an electronic collection of policy papers published in French, English and Russian by the Russia/NIS Center, Ifri.
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Syria: Russia's Best Asset in the Middle East
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