Until October 1988 riots and its opening to Mulpartism, the non-aligned-and-figurehead-of-Third-Worldism-during-the-cold-war Algeria clearly showed a favourable ideological tropism vis a vis the economic and political system advocated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The partnership evolved towards a military cooperation, and reached a climax when Moscow sold to the Algerian Navy two Class Kilo sub-marines, maintained on a regular basis in the Russian Arsenals. Entire promotions of Algerian officers and future leaders have been trained in the Russian Academies. But the end of the cold war, then the Algerian civil war froze the relationship.

Thaw came with the arrival of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as president of Algeria; this reactivated the economic and military co-operation with Moscow, sealed by the signing of a strategic pact between Algeria and Russia in 2001. Military co-operation has been as of this date, especially important in the field of sophisticated weapons exports as well as in that of training and sharing of experience. This was an opportunity for Moscow which could thus save entire parts of its military industry, especially the aeronautical one, owing to selling contracts: 78 Mig-29 AT in 2005, 50 Mig-29 fighters in 2004 and 28 Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer in 2003 - and enabled the Algerians to absorb their foreign debt to the Russians, that is 2.5 billion dollars.

Yet, co-operation underwent a biting setback when, in February 2008, the Algerian President went to Moscow in order to formalise the suspension of 28 Mig-29 delivery because of 'technical problems'. Vladimir Putin did not much appreciate to be blacklisted and soon harshly counterattacked. The following month, the newspaper Kommersan announced that the delivery of the 28 Su-30MKI fighters was postponed, owing to 'overdue payment'. The relation with the Mig 29 issue was not established and Algiers was careful not to comment on this decision. But Russia had avenged the affront.

Energy co-operation is the other pillar of the relation. The two gas exporters are well aware of the fact that the international context, marked by a strong demand, and the utmost tension concerning other major producing countries, (Iran, Venezuela), enables them to guarantee the energy security sought by the Western world. Within this framework, the idea of a cartel on the model of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is often mentioned by both countries. Thus, the Russian ambassador to Algeria explained in 2007 that a collective approach would permit to 'co-ordinate the efforts to achieve a better penetration on the gas and oil markets, including in Europe, to defend together the interests of the producing countries while taking into account those of the consumers'. Was it an incantatory position or an actual long-term strategy?

Though Gazprom, the giant Russian gas producer has announced its intention to develop an agreement in terms of prospection, extraction, transport, processing and marketing of the Algerian natural gas, the two countries are now committed in a dynamics which is based on competition rather than partnership. The Spanish market is the most symbolic example of that. In May 2008, Gas Natural signed a memorandum of trading collaboration in the field of liquefied natural gas with Gazprom, the Russian giant. Yet, the geographical proximity could have sealed the Algerian monopoly in Spain owing to the trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline, but the positions of José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero regarding western Sahara were considered as obliging toward Morocco and irritated the Algiers government; this led to the cancellation of a significant gas contract in 2007. Faced with the fickleness of Algeria, Madrid turned towards Moscow. The Georgian crisis has however remarkably changed the deal.

Indeed, in spite of the difficulties the European Union (EU) encounters with its energy dialogue with Moscow, 50% of the gas imported in Europe comes from the Russian gas pipelines. The crisis in the Caucasus yet shows that the EU can only weigh politically if it seeks for a diversification of its imports of hydrocarbons. Would Algeria benefit from the situation? Other actors would not appreciate that Algeria and the Union develop a privileged cooperation. This would be the case of the United States, which would also fear the formation of an Algiers-Teheran-Moscow strategic axis going against their interests. Condoleezza Rice, during her visit to Algiers on 8th September 2008, praised again the expertise of Algiers in the field of fight against terrorism. China could also raise objections. Beijing, which provides a qualified manpower for the major Algerian building and motorway works, and which constitutes the second largest customer of Algeria, is a significant economic partner.

Due to an increasing hydrocarbons demand, the multiplying of the strategic poles (United States, EU, China) and the disintegrating of the West-Russia relations, the creation in the mid-term of an 'Organisation of Gas Exporting Countries' (OGEC) should no longer be excluded. Its weakness would be to gather the governments in conflict with all, or many, western countries (Iran, Venezuela, Russia). Would it be profitable to Algeria to lock itself in a 'club' gathering hated governments, or toward which one is bound to be mistrustful. Nothing is less certain.