The history of European defense during the past four decades, as seen through French eyes, is closely lined to the political history of Europe. Put more precisely, it has experienced the ebbs and flows of the construction of a political Europe. France has played a key role in this history, going From the European Defense Community (EDC) to the Fouchet plans, from the Elysée Treaty to the reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU), from the Treaty on European Union to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and NATO reform. All its initiatives in favor of European defense capabilities have always covered the broader aspects of European political affirmation and have barely replied to a purely military rationale.

Since its inception, this fundamentally political aspect of European defense has faced two major dilemmas: Firstly, how do you combine national sovereignty with European political integration? And next, how do you reconcile Europe's ambitions for political and strategic autonomy with the preservation of transatlantic solidarity through NATO? As opposed to the numerous debates on the advantages of an Europe of nations or a federal Europe, we also notice fierce debate on an 'European' Europe or a transatlantic Europe, all resulting from diverging views regarding the 'final' Europe- should it be a political power or a mere civilian power? Franco-German and Franco-British relations have traditionally played an important role in these questions.

In 1996, although in different forms and within a wholly different strategic context, these questions continue to be a glaring reality. The intergovernmental conference has to determine the EU's decision-making process in matters of foreign and security policy in order to avoid paralysis of an enlarged EU through the veto of one of its member States. At NATO, meanwhile, negotiations on European defense identity presuppose a redefinition of European and American responsibility regarding security issues. France has traditionally been at the heart of all contradictions between the preservation of national sovereignty and the quest for European political integration, between ambitions for an European political power and the permanence of the Atlantic alliance. The most federal members of the EU denounced French visions of an intergovernmental Europe while the Atlantists criticized the France's ambitions for European defense as a war machine out to replace NATO and reduce American influence in Europe. Such criticism is nevertheless founded, at least to a certain degree. Since December 1995, however, France, under the leadership of Jacques Chirac, began to move with the tide regarding defense policy, but most importantly, regarding the transatlantic alliance- something unimaginable a couple of years before. After having long been a defender of the competition between European defense and NATO and after having attempted to construct European defense through reinforced co-operation between a certain number of European actors such as Eurocorps, France decided to change direction and to include European defense on NATO's reform agenda. French ambition remains unchanged regarding a powerful Europe, but the means in achieving this goal have undergone several transformations. Today, we notice a certain normalization of French and European relations and attitudes within NATO.

This initiative is of course, not an easy task. There is no proof that Euro-NATO antinomy is merely history, not to be repeated in the future. Is it possible to establish political Europe's military capability while being dependant on the United States? On the other hand, the risks of failure are high inasmuch as the potential for differences and inconsistencies regarding the normalisation of Franco-NATO relationships and the europeanization of NATO is real. The dynamics of these three methods could indeed have adverse effects upon the general coherence of the project and lead to a new European identity where the strategic Europe, including France, will be submerged in the NATO structure while the political Europe will be reduced to the pure juxtaposition of co-operating nations. Could the Franco-German relationship survive under these circumstances?

The coincidence of two negotiations, that of NATO and the IGC, nevertheless offer the rare opportunity to simultaneously solve the traditional bones of contention regarding a political Europe. Given that France, better than any other member State, incarnates the fundamental dilemmas of the European Union and given her bi-lateral policy towards NATO which is inseparable from NATO reforms in favor of the European Union, France would once again play a key role in the emergence or the despair of Europe.