Burdensharing in NATO. 3. The German Perception
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful political-military alliance in modern history. Despite doom prophecies of a superfluous NATO having lost its raison d'être, the Alliance is more active than ever before. The reason for NATO's success as the central element of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is its fundamental evolution which has taken place over the past ten years.
NATO's adaptation to new realities has almost inevitably touched the question of how to share costs and benefits among the members of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic. The question of burdensharing is of particular importance with regard to Germany, since unification has fundamentally changed the size, the domestic setting and the international weight of this country. This has necessitated an essential readjustment of German policies and politics in the field of international relations -a process which has still not come to an end. It also required Germany's allies and neighbors to continuously adapt or correct their judgements and misperceptions on German intentions and strategies.
Notwithstanding Germany's ongoing efforts to demonstrate continuity in the essentials of German foreign policy (i. e. Western orientation, European integration, transatlantic partnership, federalism etc.) there was always some mistrust that the new 'Berlin Republic' might return to old patterns of over-assertiveness or 'Schaukelpolitik' (seesaw policy) between East and West. This in turn had raised the question of whether Germany in future will be ready to contribute a fair share to security and stability in Europe and beyond.
This article takes up the issue of burden-sharing in NATO's post Cold War environment from a German point of view. First, it touches briefly on the history of the burden-sharing debate in NATO to prepare the ground for the description of continuity and change. A second part deals with the present discussion on burden-sharing and gives an assessment of the German contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. A third step is focused on the analysis of some future burden-sharing issues which are likely to create irritations and frictions between Germany and the United States, and in general between Europe and America, in the coming years.
Karl Heinz Kamp is Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Research Section at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Transatlantic Series:
The "Transatlantic Series" proposes concise analyses in English or in French on main Transatlantic debates and political issues in both the United States and Europe. It benefits from the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Available in:
Regions and themes
ISBN / ISSN
Share
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Burdensharing in NATO. 3. The German Perception
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analysesTaking the Pulse: Enough with the Annual NATO Summits, Already?
Over the past ten years, NATO has held almost as many summits as it did during the entirety of the Cold War. Are they still useful, or is it time to stop holding annual meetings?
How does France’s nuclear deterrent contribute to the defense of Europe?
France’s nuclear deterrent, serving first and foremost to defend France’s vital interests, also contributes to the defense of Europe. This contribution has been recognized within the North Atlantic Alliance since 1974, but remains little known. In a speech closely followed by France’s European partners and its adversaries alike, President Emmanuel Macron announced a new concept for French nuclear deterrence: “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée). This article aims to explain the origins of this concept, outline its main pillars, and describe the partnerships that are sought. It then discusses the relationship with the U.S. doctrine of “extended deterrence”, and finally offers some ethical considerations.
Fury from the Skies. A Strategic Analysis of Air Campaign against Iran
What is the outcome of Operations Roaring Lion (RL) and Epic Fury (EF), launched by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 28, 2026?
Finland: The Ally Who Came in from the Cold
Among all European countries, Finland is perhaps the one whose strategic culture and military model have changed the least since the end of the Cold War. Built after the end of the Second World War to deter a potential new Soviet invasion, this model enabled Finland to serve as an example of European rearmament.