Abstract
The model of high-tech war is deadlocked. Fifteen years after the first Gulf war, the Western armies are unable to win against militias of several thousand men as in Iraq, Lebanon or Afghanistan. By laying down objectives of total war, like imposing democracy on people, Westerners have created 'total' opponents. These opponents put up their ability to sacrifice as well as their imagination against our armies, which are both limited in the use of their power and becoming less and less efficient, mainly because of the exponential increase of modern armament's costs. Within the framework of limited budgetary resources, the choice of a high-tech war can only lead to dividing the armies between a rich component, whose use is less and less likely, and a more vulnerable poor component.Michel Goya, Lieutenant Colonel and writer in the Centre de doctrine d'emploi des forces (French Army), is in charge of the experience feedback of the French and foreign operations in the Asia/Middle East zone. He is the Author of La Chair et l'Acier (Paris, Tallandier, 2004) which sticks to the tactical process of the French Army during the First World War.