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Abstract

The opening declarations of Ehud Barak and the U.S. orchestration of peace talks in the summer of 2000 raised great hopes for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Camp David signified the possibility of a compromise that would have been in line with the previous agreements (Oslo). But Yassir Arafat's refusal to accept an Israeli ofer that was ambiguous resulted in his losing legitimacy as a partner for peace, whereas a bare provocation (Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple of Mount/Haram al-Sharif) exacerbated the religious element of the conflict and sparked off the second Intifada, which resulted in many more casualties than the first. Since then, the continuing colonisation of the Occupied Territories and the radicalisation of the two camps mean that the peace process has been taken hostage: if Israel and the U.S. believe that the recognition of a Palestinian state is contingent on Arafat's departure and the democratisation of the Palestinian Authority, Sharon's policy could well bring the conflict back to what it was in 1948: an existential war for the land of Palestine.

Ahmad Samih Khalidi is a Senior Associate Member at the St Antony's College and the Chief Editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies.
Translation from English: Christophe Jaquet.