Europe has set ambitious but drastic targets in order to fight climate change. The 20-20-20 objectives demonstrate this. By 2020, emissions are to be reduced by 20%, the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in energy consumption is targeted to rise to 20%, and energy efficiency is planned to increase by 20% in comparison to the 1990 levels in Europe.

The European coal industry is at a crossroads. The European Commission (EC) Energy Policy by 2020, the 20/20/20 targets, is not favourable to coal:

a 20% decrease in CO₂ emissions does not favour coal compared with natural gas, its main competitor in electricity generation;

a 20% increase in energy efficiency will lead to a decrease in energy/coal consumption;

a 20% increase in renewables will displace other energy sources, including coal.

Last week Centrica announced having signed a three-year gas supply contract with Gazprom Marketing and Trading UK entirely priced against UK spot gas market (NBP). This move follows other announcements in the sector, such as EON long-term gas supply contracts renegotiation, which allowed it to almost double its net-profit forecasts for 2012, or BP intention to sell Shaz Deniz II gas with spot-indexed contracts. All major European suppliers have been able to renegotiate long-term oil-indexed contracts with Gazprom lately and, more generally, contracts are increasingly being based on some spot-indexed price formula. How could that happen and what does it mean?

Since the 2000s, China and India's needs for hydrocarbons, coming on top of those of older industrialized Asian countries (Japan and South Korea), have considerably strengthened customer-supplier links between Asia in general and the Persian Gulf, in the energy field.

Over the last ten years, Kuwait's power consumption has doubled. This rising need for electricity has been mainly driven by the fast population growth rate, the increasing need for desalinated water, accounting for 93% of water consumption, and the economic development of the country.

First of all, shale oil is starting to take the same dimension as shale gas in the US. Already 51% of US production comes presently from unconventional gas (shale, tight gas and coal-bed methane), and outlooks predict that the US will produce more gas than Russia by 2020. Oil imports have already diminished from 60 to 45%. As domestic unconventional oil production tends to increase, - it is now around 15% - imports will probably decline even more.

The futuristic green city of Masdar in the United Arab Emirates or the latest announcements of Saudi Arabia which might now well become the new Eldorado for solar energy companies have a clear marketing varnish. But if they are showcases of green ambitions, they nonetheless reflect the situation the Gulf States face today driven by the development of heavy industry and petrochemicals but first and foremost by the rapid population growth (around 2% for Saudi Arabia and 3% for Kuwait; Qatar and the Emirates have higher population growth rate due to immigrants).

Italy is currently hit by an unprecedented economic, political and social crisis. This changing and uncertain environment affects more than ever the ability to define an energy strategy, which has never really benefitted from a clear vision and a solid organization. Since the 1987 referendum, which acknowledged the end of the nuclear program, the Italian energy policy has been elaborated through a juxtaposition of decrees and rules. Several laws have been approved either to comply with the European regulation or to correct former policies. These have contributed to the creation of a highly intricate regulation puzzle, only accessible to the most voluntary ones or the better equipped. The “success” of renewables subsidies has compromised the profitability of thermal power stations and increased the energy bills of retail consumers.