Réparer 2020 ou préparer 2030 ? L’entraînement des forces françaises à l’ère du combat multi-domaine
From basic training to the conduct of international exercises, operational readiness planning aim to make the components of military capabilities (equipment, doctrines, operational know-hows) consistent with the operational contracts decided at the strategic level.
Since the end of the Cold War, operational readiness has had to evolve in order to cope with the transformations of the French armed forces. The transformation of the strategic context and the prospect of increasingly demanding military engagements make the ability of synthetic training and information-centric capabilities to simulate scenarios of complex exercises involving high end operations at a very low cost increasingly attractive. Only physical training, however, can model all dimensions of troop commitment. Alternative methods to “physical” training must therefore be given their rightful place for armed forces to get prepared for both present challenges and multidomain operations in future conflicts.
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Réparer 2020 ou préparer 2030 ? L’entraînement des forces françaises à l’ère du combat multi-domaine
Author(s)
Morgan PAGLIA
Former Research Fellow, Security Studies Center
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