Central Asia is conventionally seen as a conflicting space for great powers.

China increasingly sees its flagship foreign policy project as a tool for restructuring global governance and a vector for promoting a new form of globalization.

Ten years after the January 2009 gas crisis, Russian-Ukrainian gas relations are at another turning point: the then concluded contracts are terminating on 31 December 2019. While trilateral talks brokered by the European Commission (EC) have started in July 2018, the real negotiations about the future of this relationship can be expected to start no earlier than in December, that is in the midst of the winter and a second to midnight. Crucial months lie ahead.

Russia’s comeback to Africa has been widely discussed since 2017.

Japan’s policies in post-Soviet Central Asia, similarly to its actions in other Asian subregions, have often been interpreted recently as reactions to China’s advances – in particular, the Belt and Road Initiative. This first impression can be misleading.

At a time when the European Union (EU) is discussing its long-term climate strategy and drafting new legislation to foster the decarbonization of its gas sector, a close look at the experience of Denmark, Germany and Italy with renewable gas production can provide valuable lessons. 

Since mid-2012, in the wake of the global financial crisis, China has sought to reinvigorate relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), notably through the creation of the 16+1 formula.

Under President Macron, France has staked out a positive but principled position towards China's BRI.