France’s nuclear deterrent, serving first and foremost to defend France’s vital interests, also contributes to the defense of Europe. This contribution has been recognized within the North Atlantic Alliance since 1974, but remains little known. In a speech closely followed by France’s European partners and its adversaries alike, President Emmanuel Macron announced a new concept for French nuclear deterrence: “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée). This article aims to explain the origins of this concept, outline its main pillars, and describe the partnerships that are sought. It then discusses the relationship with the U.S. doctrine of “extended deterrence”, and finally offers some ethical considerations.

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