Russia is facing demographic challenges that are common to all developed countries, but significantly aggravated by a range of historic circumstances that have become highly unfavorable over the course of many demographic processes. Among the main challenges are very high mortality, very low fertility and, as a result, the continued negative natural increase and overall population decline in the country. Now, these challenges are exacerbated by new ones, connected with a worsening age balance, the decrease in working-age population and the growth of dependency ratio, especially as a consequence of an ageing population.

Even if an active and effective demographic and migration policy were to be implemented in Russia, it would be impossible to reach the fundamental turning point in the demographic situation-stabilization and growth in Russia's population-in the near future. For this reason, a sound policy should involve striving for change in areas that can, in principle, be changed (decrease in mortality, some growth in fertility, attraction and integration of a reasonable number of migrants), and, at the same time, adapting economic and social institutions to those elements of the new demographic reality that cannot be changed (decrease in population, ageing population, etc.).

The 2008 war in Georgia is but a milestone on the downward curve in NATO-Russia relations, one that has been characterized by misunderstandings, misplaced expectations and missed opportunities. This is not a new Cold War, but there is an obvious need for new ideas rather than repackaged old ones. NATO has to be sensitive to genuine Russian security concerns, and the latter should appreciate that manipulation, intimidation and attempts at dividing the Alliance are not shortcuts to superpower restoration. There is ample room for cooperation if the right lessons are learned, the gap between rhetoric and reality is reduced, and policies are governed by patience and pragmatism.