Opérations de déception. Repenser la ruse au XXIe siècle
Deception operations, which refer to manoeuver, economy of armed forces and surprise, need to be reintegrated at the center of strategy to respond efficiently to modern threats.
Often associated with cunning and stratagems, deception operations are as old as warfare while frequently neglected, whether at the strategic, tactical, or operational levels. Its main methods are concealment, simulation and intoxication, all of which help to deceive the enemy and make him believe in an illusion aimed at causing his loss. Despite an effectiveness proven many times in history, this practice is not without its dilemmas-cultural and ethical, but also in terms of resources allocation. As modern armed forces witness the constant progress of information networks, digitalization and artificial intelligence, new technologies seem to provide a fertile ground for a renewal of deception operations. If well used, these would help mitigate the end of the operational comfort predicted to Western forces and avoid the advent of a new tactical blockage.
This content is available in French: Opérations de déception. Repenser la ruse au XXIe siècle.
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