Drones-tueurs et éliminations ciblées : Les Etats-Unis contre Al-Qaïda et ses affiliés
Armed drones - as they enable targeted killings - are henceforward playing a central role in American counterterrorism.
This method, first initiated under President George W. Bush, has been particularly developed under President Barack Obama. The increasingly common use of killer drones in the struggle against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates reflects to a certain extent an adaptation process to the different local constraints met in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. However, in order to understand the rise of this tactic, it is necessary to study the American bureaucratic games and to replace the boom of killer drones and targeted killing in its political, diplomatic and strategic context.
This paper is published in French only – Drones-tueurs et éliminations ciblées : Les Etats-Unis contre Al-Qaïda et ses affiliés
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