Is Joe Biden’s United States (US) returning to multilateral, traditional diplomacy? This more open stance does not eliminate either its domestic problems or the divergence in interests separating the US from the Europeans: how will open diplomacy fit in with the priority of defending US interests? Will Washington organize a broad anti-Chinese coalition that the Europeans are opposed to? Will sanctions with their resulting effects remain at the heart of US strategy? Will the Europeans be able to assert their sovereignty in the key area of new technologies against the US giants?

The Biden administration’s geopolitics is beginning to be noticed. It aims to build on a reconciled nation willing to see its foreign policy objectives as a defense of its own interests. 

The fight against climate change has a major economic dimension. With climate neutrality as their new objective, the major powers are counting on green industrial policy, and trying to contain the emissions related to their imports. 

Twenty years after 9/11, the assessment of the “War on Terror” is mixed: heavy financial and human costs, weakening of Al-Qaeda central and the Islamic State in the Levant, but creation of affiliates in different locations, fatigue of endless wars, etc. 

Edward Snowden’s revelations, the Cambridge Analytica affair and the digital transformation accelerated by the Covid-19 crisis have all shown Europe's technological dependence on foreign powers. 

Angela Merkel is ending her fourth term as German Chancellor. Although she has made a number of statements demonstrating her commitment to the European project, her record in this area nevertheless appears to be mixed. 

Underneath the rhetoric of commitment to a multilateral order, Germany's policy seems to be mainly structured around its national interests.