The European Union (EU) is the world’s main trader in agricultural products, with imports totaling €142 billion in 2020. These imported agricultural products include commodities – palm oil, beef, cocoa, coffee, soy, etc. – that are responsible for deforestation in producing countries and thus create an “imported deforestation” problem for Europe.

The shocks from COVID-19 likely to affect energy and the climate are multiple and unprecedented in scale and scope.

Shocks from collapsing prices due to plummeting and then paralyzed demand combined with overproduction: this is the case for oil, but also to a lesser extent for electricity and gas. Other raw materials are also being affected.

Shocks to investments, because oil as well as electricity companies are experiencing dramatic falls in earnings while waiting for the peak of the pandemic to pass. They are cutting spending and revising or postponing projects. Jobs and smaller company survival are under threat.

China’s 2018 energy consumption data capture the ambiguity of Beijing’s attitude toward climate change. Energy demand rose by 3.5% to 3,155 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), with an increase of coal consumption (though its share in the overall energy mix is decreasing) and an expected greenhouse gas (GHG) emission surge of 2.3%, to 9.5 gigatonnes (Gt) for the same year. 

Since its creation in 2005, the European emission trading system (EU ETS) has been through several periods of turmoil. With emission allowances (EUA) averaging around 7 euros per ton from 2012 to 2017, European Member States have been trying to remedy the depressed price signals successively through market design reforms at both European level (backloading, market stability reserve) and national level, with the UK introducing a carbon price floor for its domestic power sector in 2013.

As 2017 drew to close, China officially approved plans for its long-awaited national Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) outlined some of the implementation details[1]. Though it will be limited to the power sector (and combined heat and power, or CHP) at first, it will nevertheless be the world’s largest carbon market. It is expected to cover 1,700 companies representing approximately 30% of China’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. China’s CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion amounted to approximately 8,796 metric tonnes of CO₂ equivalent (MtCO₂Eq.) in 2016, and seem to remain stable since 2014, though they appear to increase again in 2017[2]. Shanghai should host the national market exchange, which will be jointly owned by the governments of other provinces while Hubei should host the registry[3].

A range of announcements of energy and climate coalitions have been made during COP21. Beyond their important diplomatic objectives, these new forms of coalitions bring scientists and industry leaders towards new long term visions of energy consumption modes.

On November 4th 2015, the Ifri Center for Energy held an international conference on the future of Climate Action beyond the COP21. The conference brought together key experts to outline reasonable expectations for the Paris Climate Summit, in terms of binding commitments from the parties and, more broadly, in terms of the profound transformation that an agreement could trigger.