Abstract
The inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine promises to transform the art of the possible in Europe and Eurasia. But it remains to be seen whether the new president will hold power or simply hold office. The most dangerous period in any revolution usually arises just after it takes place. At home and in the former Soviet Union, Yushchenko confronts a nexus of power that is ingrown, opaque and still highly resourceful. There are grounds for hope: a political culture which, by post-Soviet standards, is democratic and pluralistic; the Euro-Atlantic orientation of many who work inside State structures; a considerable degree of ethnic and linguistic tolerance; and (despite recent appearances) the lack of strong separatist sentiment. There are also grounds for prudence: the scale of public expectations; the tenacity of criminal structures; strong regional divisions and a complex international environment. Until Russia changes its paradigm of geopolitics and "good neighborliness", it will pose serious problems for Ukraine. Until the West reinforces Ukraine's advance by changes in policy, its transformation will be precarious and its prospects uncertain.

James SHERR is Research Fellow at the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

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Abstract
With roughly five million Muslims on its national territory, France has become a focal point for a certain number of international players who believe that exercising control over this population is a sure way to increase their power. This article attempts to construct a typology of the various international players vying for dominance over Islam in France. First, there are those countries from which most of the Muslims in France originate (Algeria, Morocco and Turkey). These States are making use of Islam in France as a way of controlling their expatriate populations. They also deploy their religion as a bastion against the rhetoric of Islamists who come from these same countries. Second, Saudi Arabia, via the intermediary of para-State structures such as the World Islamic League, or through its Islamic universities, is developing networks and agents in order to turn itself into an Islamic religious superpower. Finally, transnational Islamic movements such as the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, close to the Muslim Brotherhood, are building a transnational network with the aim of becoming indispensable players in the re-islamization of France.

Samir AMGHAR holds a diploma in Political Sciences from the University of Paris-I and finishes a Ph.D. at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris.

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Abstract
Ever since the accession of Turkey to the European Union has become an increasingly concrete possibility, one of the most discussed subjects in Europe but also in Turkey is the Moslem identity of the great majority of the Turkish population. This article aims to give an outline of the different components of this plural Islam, focusing on European Turks and their politico-religious memberships. The article also discusses the concepts of official and oppositional Islam in the Turkish context and questions the relevance of this dichotomy. Finally, the paternalistic attitude of the Turkish State with respect to the European Turks is analyzed, in particular as it applies to the religious field.

Samim AKGONUL is historian and political scientist, Researcher in the 'Société, droit et religion en Europe' laboratory at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) and Junior Lecturer at the Marc Bloch University in Strasbourg.

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Abstract
In the United States, Islam is becoming today a 'public religion'. The first Muslim organizations established in North America have been influenced by the ideologies of political Islam, but have in the 1980s opened up to the idea of their political participation in the American system. In the 1990s, the Federal State initiated a symbolic recognition of American Islam at a time when foreign Islamic groups started to become the 'enemy'. Torn between these two representations of Islam, American Muslims have had to reinvent their discourse in order to fit within American definitions of pluralism.

Malika ZEGHAL is Researcher in Political Science and teaches at the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris and at the Chicago University.

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Abstract
Nothing, before 1978, could have led one to predict that the wealthy and strong regime of the Shah would collapse so quickly in 1979. One had expected that the liberal nationalist forces would have gotten the upper hand over the religious leaders whom nobody had suspected to be real outsiders. This article explains the historical roots of this religious revival, going back at least to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. It analyzes the way in which the Islamic Republic consolidated its power thanks to the war with Iraq. Even after the loss of popular support –especially among the youth– the Islamic Republic of Iran has no real challengers today. It has helped foster the emergence of a new type of 'Islamic secularism' among Iranian intellectuals, which corresponds to a new way of envisaging the future of Iran within the framework of Islam.

Yann RICHARD is researcher at the 'Monde iranien' laboratory in the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) and teaches at Sorbonne nouvelle University where he manages the Institut d'études iraniennes (Institute for Iranian Studies).

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Abstract
In Morocco, the emergence of Islamism in the political scene questions the monopoly of Royalty over the religious sphere. It is through the 1997 elections that the PJD breaks into the system and becomes a mainstream political party. After the Casablanca events of May 16th 2003, it was put under scrutiny as if it embraced the whole Islamic movement. Following this ostracism, two events have been used to show its integration in the local political life and its close relationships with the Monarchy: the local elections of September 2003 (in spite of the great caution displayed by limiting the candidatures running for districts, the PJD had good results wherever it was present); the organization of the 5th Congress where the PJD discussed political issues only and preempt values dear to the Monarchy. In two years time, the party's references started to change together with its political positioning as it doesn't refuse anymore to participate to a new government. Nevertheless, by becoming a party like others, the PJD takes the risks of losing its identity, and therefore, losing some electors.

Khadija MOHSEN-FINAN, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, is Research Fellow at Ifri Paris. She teaches at the Institut d'études politiques (IEP) and at the University of Venezia.

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Abstract
The 20th century, which cannot be said to have run short of massacres, has witnessed only a minute number of confirmed biological attacks. The reason for such a sparse use of biological weapons had less to do with international commitments undertaken by the vast majority of nations in 1925, than with questions raised within the military with regard to the actual practical utility of such weapons on the battlefield. This did not however prevent the Soviet Union from building a real biological empire for itself, nor did it prevent the proliferation of biological weapons programs in a large number of developing countries. The interest which terrorist groups manifest towards these types of weapons does moreover justify the development of a new approach towards proliferation and the possession of biological weapons by non-state actors. It is for all these reasons that the experience acquired in the 1990s through international inspection processes or revelations regarding states which have been conducting offensive biological activities –the Soviet Union, Iraq and South Africa– is so precious. Lessons may be learnt in order to improve prevention, detection and protection. The first line of defense against biological weapons is indeed the rational appraisal of all that has been witnessed and realized in the past, as well as all that is known today.

Thérèse DELPECH is Head of Prospective at the Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA) and Research Fellow at the Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI-FNSP) in Paris. She is Representative at the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and Member of the Blix Commission about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

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Abstract
South Africa initiated the establishment of a small-scale chemical and biological weapons program in the early 1980s and terminated it shortly before the first democratic elections were held in 1994. This paper considers the lessons for disarmament which can be learnt from South Africa's chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, in particular, what can be learnt about, (i) the factors which motivate States to develop biological weapons programs; (ii) the factors which influence the nature, scale and duration of such programs, (iii) how BW programs are detected (or not), and (iv) which factors influence the decision to terminate such programs.

Chandré GOULD is General Coordinator of the BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP). She pursued researches on Biological and chemical arms at the Center for Conflicts Resolution.

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Abstract
The scope, sophistication, and ambition of the biological weapons programs of the Soviet Union were dramatic. Yet they were largely unknown outside secret circles in Moscow. In the early 1990s, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed the existence of these Soviet-vintage programs -and acknowledged his lack of success in closing them down. This experience is rich in lessons for Western security specialists. It is a reminder of the sometimes significant gap between perceptions and reality with regard to secret military programs. It illustrates the potential military utility of biological weapons as well as the potential impact of biotechnology on the BW threat. This experience also illustrates the limited success of arms control in dealing with especially willful violators. Russia's current biological warfare activities remain a subject of concern.

Brad ROBERTS is a member of the Research Team at the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, (Virginia, United States). He is also Assistant Teacher at the George Washington University and President of the Research Advisory Commitee of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute.

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Abstract
Eight years of inspections and monitoring by UN weapons inspectors and the Iraq Survey Group (reporting to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) have yielded extensive information on the Iraqi biological weapons program and some useful lessons. Iraq's pursuit of biological weapons during the 1980s was shaped both by geostrategic factors and by the unique characteristics of the Iraqi regime, including the personal idiosyncrasies of Saddam Hussein. For Saddam, biological weapons served multiple strategic functions: pre-conflict deterrence, intraconflict deterrence, and escalation dominance. Iraqi BW use doctrine and command-and-control arrangements were influenced both by external threats and domestic factors (such as Saddam's fear of a coup d'Etat) and evolved over time in response to crisis. The UN investigation of the Iraqi biological weapons program demonstrated the effectiveness of an approach combining multiple methodologies, including aerial surveillance, on-site inspections, import monitoring, interviews, and sampling and analysis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Iraqi defectors provided little useful information and, indeed, were often a source of deliberate distorsions.

Jonathan B. TUCKER, Researcher at the Center of Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in the Monterey Institute of international Studies (Washington), has directed the Chemical and Biological Weapon Non-proliferation Program (CBWNP).

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Abstract
The use of pathogens as biological weapons was considered since their early discovery. Attacks using 'natural' virulent germs, such as the bacillus of plague or anthrax, were perpetrated during the 20th century by States or terrorists. Recent scientific progress dramatically changes the threat of biological weapons, by improving the virulence or the resistance of pathogens (bacteria or virus), by genetic manipulations. At the edge of the 21st century, it is now possible to synthesize in vitro small viruses, thus it is conceivable to design very dangerous viruses, such as Ebola or smallpox viruses. Recent technological breakthroughs permit the creation of novel germs, extremely dangerous since never encountered before by highly susceptible humans. Prevention of bioterrorist attacks requires a careful scientific surveillance of potentially dangerous biotechnological innovations, and eventually retention of scientific information of the most unsafe data. Overcoming the crisis induced by bioterrorist attacks remains a major problem of information management.

Patrick BERCHE, is a Doctor, Professor of Microbiology, Bacteriology-Virology Consultant at the Hôpital Necker-Enfants malades in Paris and Dean of Hôpital Necker-Enfants malades. Expert to the Délégation générale pour l'Armement (DGA), he is a specialist in Bacterial Genetic and Biological Risk linked topics.

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Abstract
The Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA renamed Transformation a few years ago and pursued with perseverance in the United States, found in the Iraqi Freedom operation a tremendous demonstration of its technical effectiveness. Progress in the three fields of precision, detection and communication -combined with the faith in superiority supported by control of knowledge- demonstrated the remarkable capacities brought by the new possibilities of precise stand off destruction. However, this formidable tactical and professional victory did not achieve conditions of strategic success; currently, the political result is nothing like what was envisioned. Close to two years after the official end of the initial campaign, the actual situation in Iraq, shows the ambiguity of Transformation with, at the same time, its remarkable success as an amplifier of tactical effectiveness and, on the opposite, its moderate results -at the very least- at the strategic level. Today, when the Atlantic convergence of the strategic interests and models of use of armed violence is no longer obvious, it is thus useful to question, in Europe, the necessity for adopting a vision of the armed forces deeply marked by a specific American strategic culture.

Pierre GARONNE has lived many years in the United States; today, he dedicates a part of his activities in analysing political and military affairs of this country.

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Abstract
This article argues that the global AIDS pandemic is no longer solely a health issue, but also has emerging human, national, and international security dimensions that must be acknowledged by scholars and international policy-makers. In order to substantiate this argument, this article specifically analyzes these three dimensions in greater detail, and outlines the broad policy implications that follow from such an analysis. It is important to recognize these security dimensions of the AIDS pandemic, the article concludes, (i) in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the nature and extent of the contemporary pandemic; (ii) in order for the level of the international response to become commensurate with the extent of the global challenge posed by the AIDS pandemic; and (iii) because the security sector, as high-risk group and vector of the virus, can make a responsible contribution to the international efforts to reduce the transmission of HIV/AIDS.

Stefan ELBE is Senior Lecturer in the Politics and International Relations Department at Sussex University (Great Britain), where he teaches on Security Questions. He has published 'Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS' (Oxford University Press, 2003) and 'Europe: a Nietzschean Perspective' (London, Routledge, 2003).

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Abstract
For the past decade, Japanese foreign and security policy has been confronted with a series of external and national events conducting to a new rationale on international and national defense posture. While the political and legislative legacy since the end of the Second World War had been rather balanced with compromises to the pacifist norm and to the bilateral security relationship with the United States, the law-making process on defense issues has been strengthened, since the early 1990s, following the pragmatic/realist assessment that Japan needs new legal instruments, to react to indenfied potential external threats, and a larger autonomy while confirming but clarifying the terms of the US-Japan military cooperation within the international contribution to peace. The current resolute engagement of Japanese policy-makers on defense and security issues is part of the progessive normalization of the country that could signify, if the basic posture is maintained, the confirmation of Japan as a civilian power with defensive military tools.

Régine SERRA is Invited Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union (ISS-EU), and also associated to the research of the Institut d'Asie orientale. She is Junior Lecturer at the Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (INALCO) in Paris, and at Lille1 University.

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